This paper introduces granting of "exclusive bidding rights" to a subset buyers as a way of fostering their pre-auction information acquisition. A revenue maximizing monopolist gives N * , the socially efficient number of informed buyers, or N * + 1 buyers the exclusive right to bid, depending on a lumpsum value discovery (VD) cost. In the former case, equilibrium VD is efficient but allocation is ex-post inefficient while in the latter case it is the opposite (and participation in the auction is stochastic). Interestingly, the optimal reserve depends discontinuously and non-monotonically on the VD cost but is notably independent of endogenous information concerning VD.
Introduction
In many auction or auction-like environments, a monopolist seller often seeks to directly control the number of potential buyers. For instance, facing a hostile takeover bid, whether the management of a target seeks a "white knight" is a conscious decision. In government procurement contracts and research tournaments, as for instance Fullerton and McAfee (1999) note, the designer spends considerable resources in limiting entry to a set of eligible bidders. A range of factors (such as affirmative action, geographical preferences etc.) affect a monopolist seller's choice of the size and nature of the market. This paper however focuses on the incentives the size of the market provides for pre-auction information acquisition and participation by buyers and its consequence for revenue.
Indeed, often a buyer has to incur a cost to ascertain her actual value of the object on sale. Such an investment is in fact necessary for a buyer to participate in the auction if the prior beliefs result in a mean value for the object that is below the seller's (known) valuation. On the other hand, such investment carries with it the risk of a loss since winning in an auction is not typically assured. Since this risk rises with an increase in the number of buyers who choose to become informed and participate, there is a disincentive to invest in the first place. Granting exclusive bidding rights to a (sub)set of buyers is an intuitive way of reducing this negative externality. In this paper we characterize the revenue maximizing assignment of bidding rights in a standard IPV setting where the buyers are initially uninformed of their types. 1 Interestingly, our analysis here also sheds additional insights on some of the issues pursued in Bulow and Klemperer (1996) (hereafter BK) and Bergemann and Välimäki (2002) 
(hereafter BV).
To elaborate, a monopolist seller of a single object defines the "market" by offering a subset of a given supply of M buyers the exclusive right to bid in an auction, which she chooses. Each of these buyers then choose whether to invest a lumpsum c > 0 for the discovery of her private value for the object and whether to participate in the auction. The objective is then to maximize revenue across all these participation (both mixed and pure) equilibria, auction formats and market sizes. It is easy to visualize that there exists an integer N c such that a social planner would invest in the value discovery of N ef = 1 The use of exclusionary provisions is quite common in many economic environments. For instance, a labor contract is often an exclusive dealing between the employer and the employee. Or, for that matter, the idea that voluntary contributions for the provision of a public good can be higher by making it exclusive is also well known. Both Fullerton and McAfee (1999) and Che and Gale (2003) emphasize the value of exclusion in R&D contests while Segal and Whinston (2000) discusses the exclusionary provisions in the context of the holdup problem. We are not aware of a systematic study that discusses the role of exclusion in auctions. min{N c , M } buyers. We show that a revenue maximizing monopolist selects the market size to be either N ef or N ef + 1, depending on the precise location of c. In the former case, she runs a Second Price Auction with a non-trivial reserve. Although equilibrium value discovery turns out to be socially efficient, the allocation of the object is ex-post inefficient. In the latter case, the object is allocated through an ex-post efficient auction. However, bidder participation is stochastic and value discovery is socially inefficient.
That it is optimal for the seller to exclude a positive number of buyers from bidding in the auction may seem at odds with the insights of BK. For, BK have forcefully argued, under the assumption that it is always ex-post efficient to transfer the object to a buyer (their serious bidder assumption), that the seller always gains by adding a buyer. However, recall that their result on the benefits of additional competition concerns adding an informed buyer. Here, the seller must trade off the increased revenue that she would have if an additional informed buyer participates with the provision of incentives for a buyer to become informed in the first place. Our analysis in fact shows that the value of adding an uninformed buyer is positive whenever the current market size is less than N ef and negative if it is greater than N ef + 1. 2 A salient feature of the analysis here, in the spirit of BV, is that we allow for value discovery choices to be unobservable. This is natural as in many situations it is infeasible to prevent the buyers from covertly pursuing an investigation of the qualities of the object. Consequently, a selling procedure cannot, a priori, be contingent on the information acquisition decisions of the buyers, just as in BV. However, an important difference is that their setup rules out a fixed cost of information acquisition. Yet, fixed costs play an important informational role as they determine whether a potential buyer actually participates. 3 This, in principle, would allow the seller to implicitly condition her selling procedures on the information acquisition decisions. Interestingly, we will see that the seller does not use this information at the optimum as the optimal reserve turns out to be a function of the value discovery cost c alone.
In fact, the behavior of the optimal reserve as a function of c is in stark contrast to that of auctions without exclusion. As one might expect, as the cost increases, it becomes 2 Determining the optimal subset of buyers to be given the exclusive bidding rights is a global maximization problem whereas the value of an additional buyer is a local change in the revenue with respect to market size.
3 BV's focus is on implementing efficient information acquisition unlike the interest in revenue maximization here. Shi (2007) takes up the issue of revenue maximization but does not consider exclusion as a revenue maximizing instrument. In an affiliated values setting, Persico (2000) studies incentives to acquire information and implications for revenue in standard auctions. Again, he assumes all buyers necessarily participate in the auction.
optimal for the seller to have fewer buyers. One can therefore find tipping points so that when the cost goes over one of these, it becomes optimal for the seller to exclude an extra buyer. At any such point, the optimal reserve jumps above the seller's valuation (v 0 ) and then decreases continuously to v 0 and remains there until the next tipping point. Furthermore, in between these tipping points, participation in the revenue maximizing auction by the eligible buyers changes from mixed strategy to pure strategy. Arguably these features place empirically testable restrictions on whether the seller grants exclusive bidding rights.
Brief intuition for the results. If the distribution of values is such that it is always expost efficient to trade, i.e. the "serious bidder assumption" of BK holds, their insights coupled with those of Levin and Smith (1994) (hereafter LS) yield a rough but simple answer to optimal "market" choice. Let u N denote the ex-ante payoff of a typical bidder in a regular English auction. If c is no greater than u N ef , with a market size of N ef , every buyer has the incentive to invest in value discovery and participate with probability one. Seller's payoff is then the same as in the regular English auction. BK's analysis says that a seller prefers the regular English auction with an extra informed buyer to an optimal mechanism without her. Therefore, the optimal market size must be at least N ef . On the other hand, it turns out that if more than N ef buyers are given the right to bid in an optimal mechanism, then the equilibrium participation is in strictly mixed strategies. LS have shown that in auctions with endogenous participation, if the equilibrium participation is necessarily endogenous even after reducing the potential market size, the seller gains. This "market tightness" result of LS can now be applied directly to conclude that no more than N ef + 1 buyers must be given the right to bid. As an example in BK illustrates, the logic of their argument does not extend to prior distributions where trade may be ex-post inefficient for some realizations, as it is in this paper. Nonetheless, these arguments help in developing the initial intuition. 4
Relation to Literature. The interplay between information acquisition and auction design has been explored in a number of papers. Much of the vast literature on auctions with entry costs interprets these as the cost of value discovery. 5 In these works, the seller does not directly exclude subsets of buyers. However, if the seller picks a market size that is sufficiently large, some of the insights from this literature (such as those in LS) become 4 The "serious bidder assumption" is also in LS. (See (full) paragraph 2, page 587, Levin and Smith (1994) .) It will be evident from the analysis here that there is a direct extension of their results for IPV even if this assumption is dropped. 5 See McAfee and McMillan (1987) , Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1993) , Bag (1997) , Tan (1992) , Harstad (1990) , Levin and Smith (1994) or the more recent Persico (2000) , Ye (2004) , Moreno and Wooders (2006) , Crèmer et al. (2007) and Shi (2007) .
relevant. Further, in many papers in this literature, the authors rely explicitly on the use of inspection/entry fees that a buyer must pay if she is to discover her value. We comment in Section 3.3 on how the analysis changes if the seller can use such instruments in addition to granting exclusive bidding rights. Other models of entry in auctions such as Samuelson (1985) and Stegeman (1996) assume a buyer incurs participation costs after observing a private signal. Our paper is not directly related to that class of models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses variations of a social planners' problem concerning value discovery. Apart from this being of inherent economic interest, the process also allows us to obtain a solution to the revenue maximizing monopolist's problem with relative ease. Section 3 takes up the monopolist's problem with the main result appearing as Theorem 1 in Section 3.1. An outline of the proof in terms of the value of a bidder appears in Section 3.2. Section 4 concludes.
Efficiency
A monopolist owns a single object worth v 0 to her. There are M agents each of whom initially knows only that her value for the object is a random variable V i that is continuously distributed according to a probability distribution function F and a positive density f on an interval [v, v] . By incurring a cost c > 0, any of these agents is able to discover her true value of the object. For concreteness, we refer to c as the value discovery cost but its formal equivalence with any other participation cost that is incurred before an agent knows her type should be clear. Assume throughout that
so that unless an agent incurs the cost, there are no (expected) gains from trade. The importance of this restriction is that it forces a buyer to engage in value discovery for any trade to be mutually beneficial. Throughout, we will also assume that E[max{V i −v 0 , 0}] ≥ c. This makes it socially desirable to discover the value of at least one buyer. A further discussion on the role of (1) is deferred to Section 3.4.
Our ultimate purpose is to study the monopolist's problem, which is taken up in Section 3. We begin however by considering issues regarding efficiency. Such an analysis is of course of intrinsic economic interest. What is more, as described in the introduction, the solution to the monopolist's problem is intimately related to certain aspects of efficiency.
To discuss efficiency in environments with asymmetric information, we need to first specify the set of mechanisms that are feasible to the social planner. (See Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) ) In the first instance, Section 2.1 considers the feasible mechanisms such that the planner is able to conduct transfers between the players prior to their knowing their types. In Section 2.2 we will look at the case when the planner cannot make such transfers.
Notation Throughout, by SPA(r) we mean the second price auction with the reserve set at r. SPA k (r) denotes a symmetric equilibrium play of the game form SPA(r) with k buyers in a typical IPV setting where the values are drawn according to F . u k (r) denotes the corresponding ex-ante payoff of a typical bidder in that auction and R k (r) the expected revenue. Also let G k denote the probability distribution of the random variable
which are respectively the ex-ante payoff of a typical buyer and the total welfare that is achieved in any ex-post efficient allocation of the object among k (informed) buyers, for instance under SPA k (v 0 ).
Efficiency with ex-ante transfers
Assume that the planner is capable of making transfers between the buyers and the seller prior to value discovery. To discuss ex-ante efficiency, one then needs only calculate the total ex-ante welfare that is generated through an ex-post efficient allocation of the object and see how this varies as the planner chooses the probability with which an agent's valuation is discovered. The planner's choice is then to pick a vector p = (p 1 , . . . , p M ) where p i is the probability with which she incurs the cost of discovering the realization of V i . Note that by (1), it is inefficient to transfer the object from the seller to any buyer whose valuation is not discovered. Therefore, conditional on the event that exactly the valuations of K ⊆ {1, . . . , M } are discovered, ex-post efficient allocation of the object among the informed buyers results in a total welfare of W k from allocation of the good, where k = #(K). Therefore, the ex-ante social welfare resulting from a choice p is
where β k (K, p) is the probability that the values of exactly those buyers in K are discovered.
We will say p * is a socially efficient investment in value discovery if it maximizes S(·).
In order to characterize p * , first recall that SPA k (v 0 ) is the VCG mechanism for allocating the object to k privately informed buyers and the seller. Therefore, the change in welfare from dropping a bidder from SPA k (v 0 ) is also the payoff of a buyer in it, i.e.,
Since u k < u k−1 and lim k→∞ u k = 0, there exists a unique integer N c such that
Proposition 1 If u M ≥ c, it is socially efficient to invest in the value discovery of all the buyers, with probability one. If u M < c, then it is socially efficient to discover the values of only N c (< M ) buyers, with probability one.
That is, set
Unless u Nc = c, the above is also necessary.
Proof. Note that S(p i , p −i ) is a linear function of p i for any p −i . Therefore, setting p i = 1 for some of the i ∈ {1, . . . , M } and setting p i = 0 for the remainder constitutes an optimum. If some k of the p i 's are set at 1, then the resulting social welfare is W k − kc. By (3), u k − c is the change in welfare if values of k agents are discovered instead k − 1 agents. Given the inequalities in (4), choosing k = N ef as described maximizes welfare.
Remark 1 A noteworthy feature of efficient value discovery is that when M > N c , efficiency requires an asymmetric treatment of the buyers -only the values of N c are discovered. By (1), socially efficient value discovery a priori excludes M − N c buyers from ever receiving the object.
Efficiency in standard allocation procedures
When it is possible to make unrestricted transfers between the buyers and the seller, any ex-ante efficient allocation simply involves a split of the surplus S(p * ) between the seller and the N ef buyers. On the other hand, if such unrestricted transfers are not feasible at the ex-ante stage, it is important to carefully specify the set of mechanisms or allocation procedures that are feasible for transferring the gains from exchange of the object and the costs of value discovery. Thus, efficiency can only be evaluated relative to the set of feasible mechanisms. It is beyond the scope of this paper to offer a complete characterization of the efficient frontier relative to an arbitrarily given set of mechanisms. For the purpose of this paper, which is the monopolist problem, it is adequate to discuss efficiency in the context of a class of mechanisms that we call "standard allocation procedures".
Definition 1 (Standard Allocation Procedure) A standard allocation procedure (SAP) is a triple ν := (N, p, r) in which: a). Exactly N buyers are asked to discover their valuations with probability p and b). Once value discovery occurs, the object is allocated as per SPA(r) among the informed.
It will be seen that the optimal strategy for the monopolist across a much wider class of selling procedures is intimately connected with the best that the seller can achieve in the class of standard allocation procedures. 6
Given a SAP, the expected revenue is Π N (p, r) while the ex-ante utility of being a buyer whose value will be discovered is p(U N (p, r) − c) where
where β k (p, N ) is the probability of k successes from a binomial variate with parameters (p, N ). The payoff of a buyer whose value will not be discovered is zero. A SAP ν is said to be individually rational if p(U N (p, r) − c) ≥ 0 and Π N (p, r) ≥ 0. As usual, ν is ex-ante efficient if there is no other SAP ν that Pareto dominates ν in terms of the ex-ante payoffs.
It is possible to complete the characterization of all efficient and individually rational standard allocation procedures. We avoid the digression and instead focus on those that are most favorable for the seller among all such efficient SAP.
Definition 2 (Seller Optimal SAP) An individually rational SAPν := (N ,p,r) is said to be seller optimal if ΠN (p,r) ≥ Π N (p, r) for any other individually rational SAP ν = (N, p, r).
Given c > 0, first define r c and p c from the equations u N ef (r c ) = c, and
6 Efficiency issues can also be addressed for the larger class that corresponds to the seller's choice set.
In this class, the planner runs the auction SPA k (r k ) for possibly r k = r k , when the values of k buyers known. We do not pursue this here.
where
is the total welfare under SAP ν = (N, p, r). 7
Proposition 2 below gives a complete and formal characterization of seller optimal SAP. There are exactly two possibilities. In one, value discovery is socially efficient, just as in the case with transfers, with N ef buyers becoming informed with probability one. However, unlike in the case with transfers, SPA N ef (r) with a certain non-trivial reserve r ≤ r c is run to allocate the object. In the other, exactly N ef + 1 buyers are asked to discover their valuations, each with probability p c , which happens to be in (0, 1). Thus value discovery is inefficient compared to the case of unrestricted transfers. However, among the informed buyers, the object is allocated in an ex-post efficient manner. The formal statement is below.
Proposition 2 Let c > 0 be given. The seller optimal SAP is as follows.
2. If N ef < M , either the seller optimal SAP isν 1 , just as in Part 1, or it isν 2 := (N c + 1, p c , v 0 ).
Proofs of Part 1 and Part 2 of the Proposition are fairly intuitive and are given below. Part 1 comes from a simple generalization of (3) whereupon Part 2 is a direct consequence of the insights of LS. Proof of Part 3 is more technical and is given in the Appendix A.
Proof. It is well known that
7 LS show that pc is unique and in the interior of [0, 1] under the assumption that v0 = 0. Nonetheless, their proof is applicable even if v0 = 0 8 This is simply the analogue of (3) when the value of object for the seller is r.
Consider any ν = (N, p, r) such that N ≤ N ef and (N, p) = (N c , 1). Since for all k ≤ N ef , R N ef (r) ≥ R k (r) with a strict inequality when k = N ef , if at all ν is optimal, it must be the case u N ef (r) < c. Otherwise, (N, 1, r) yields the higher payoff of R N ef (r) instead of Π N (p, r). Therefore, r > r c and u k (r c ) > c for all k < N c . Also, since r c ≥ v 0 , we have
which is the seller's payoff under the individually rational SAP (N ef , 1, r c ). The first inequality is due to ν being individually rational (see Lemma A in Appendix A), the second inequality is due to the fact that W k (·) is decreasing to the right of v 0 . Therefore, a seller optimal mechanism must be either of the form (N ef , 1, r) for some r ≤ r c or must have N ≥ N ef + 1. Among the former types,ν 1 yields the greatest revenue. This establishes Part 1.
On the other hand, if N ef = N c < M , the other candidates for an optimal SAP necessarily involve N ≥ N c + 1. For this class, through (direct) application of Proposition 1 and Proposition 9 of LS, any ν with N > N ef + 1 is dominated byv 2 = (N ef + 1, p c , v 0 ). (Indeed, this domination is merely the noted "market tightness" principle outlined in LS.) This proves Part 2. Proof of Part 3 is in the Appendix A.
Remark 2 When the seller optimal SAP isν 1 andr < r c , note that U N ef (1,r) = u N ef (r) > c. In this case individual rationality constraint does not bind. It is binding whenr = r c simply by construction. On the other hand, the individual rationality constraint is necessarily binding when the seller optimal SAP isν 2 . For, note that when this is the case, p c is interior and maximizes the expected social surplus, namely the maximand in (5). By Proposition 6 of LS (or see Lemma A in the Appendix A), U Nc+1 (p c , v 0 ) = c is the necessary first order condition in that maximization problem.
Remark 3 (Social value of an informed buyer in SAP) One implication of (8) is that u k (r) ≥ c ⇒ W k (r) − W k−1 (r) ≥ c whenever r ≥ v 0 . In other words, when an additional bidder is added to SPA k−1 (r), the change in that bidder's utility is u k (r). The above implication says that if this is enough to cover the cost of value discovery for that marginal agent, the total social welfare must rise from W k−1 (r) − (k − 1)c to W k (r) − kc. Intuitively, one would expect at least part of this rise to be transferable to the seller even if constrained to SAPs. From this perspective, it is natural that seller optimal SAP must include at least N ef buyers.
Revenue
A selling method of the monopolist begins in stage 0 with her choosing an integer N ≤ Monly buyers i = 1, . . . , N are eligible to bid in an auction for the object. The auction itself occurs in stage two among those in {1, . . . , N } that have elected to incur the fixed cost c of value discovery. In stage one, the auction format or the rules that govern the subsequent allocation of the object are announced. It is in Stage 1, with a public knowledge of both N and the subsequent auction format, buyers i ≤ N simultaneously choose whether to engage in value discovery. Depending on the outcome, they may choose to participate in the auction in Stage 2.
Except for the fact that the seller chooses the market of potential buyers in stage zero, the entry process in the subsequent two stages is virtually the same as in LS. In particular we adopt their Assumption 4: "The auction mechanism and the number of potential bidders N is common-knowledge and the number of actual bidders is publicly revealed prior to Stage 2." The choice of mechanisms that are available to the seller to use in Stage 2 are also identical to those allowed in LS. They include any rule by which a bidder wins and pays for the item only if his bid is the highest and moreover to equilibria in which an informed buyer's bidding behavior in the auction is increasing in her type.
Given the above assumptions, a routine appeal to the payoff equivalence principle for IPV settings tells us that there is no loss in generality by describing the selling procedure by a vector r = (r 1 , .., r N ) where r k is the common-knowledge reserve price at which a second price auction is run when there are k actual bidders.
Definition 3 (Selling Procedure) A strategy for the seller (a selling procedure) is a tuple µ := (N, r) where N is the number of agents given exclusive bidding rights and r = (r 1 , . . . , r k , . . . , r N ) is a vector of reserve prices such that SPA(r k ) is held by the seller in the event there are k actual bidders.
Note that the selling procedure is contingent only on the number of actual participants in the auction and not the value discovery decisions. Our focus is on situations where information acquisition is covert (as in BV). If investment in value discovery is publicly verifiable, it becomes possible for the seller to directly influence the cost c through the use of either a subsidy s ≥ 0 or a fee f ≥ 0 which transforms the cost to c − s or c + f respectively. Importantly, s and f are transfers that accrue to a buyer regardless of actual value but contingent on her making the investment. (In the literature on auctions with endogenous entry, these transfers would be referred to as ex-ante entry fee/subsidy.) In this case, one needs to modify the selling procedure as (N, r, s) or (N, r, f ). In Section 3.3, we explain that allowing for subsidies has no impact on the results while the presence of fees may indeed change the outcome. In the remainder of the paper, the assumption is that either value discovery decisions are unobservable or it is infeasible to charge ex-ante entry fees.
It is important to note that, unlike in BV, the participation decision is endogenous and can convey information about a buyer's value discovery choice. In fact, we claim that there is no loss of generality in assuming that a buyer who has the right to participate in the auction does so if and only if she becomes informed. To see this, first note that no payments are made by a buyer that does not win the object. This makes it a weakly dominant strategy for an informed buyer to participate. An uninformed buyer who participates in the auction will bid as if her valuation for the object is E[V i ]. Given (1), for such an buyer to have any chance of winning the object, the seller must be setting a reserve below her valuation v 0 . In Appendix B, we show that it is a dominated strategy for the seller to choose such reserves. Because of this, it is a weakly dominant strategy for an uninformed buyer not to participate.
The above entry behavior is retained throughout the paper. 9 It is important to note that although information about the actual number of bidders then fully reveals whether a buyer is informed, this information only occurs after the investment decision occurs. This prevents the seller from charging fees ex-ante that are contingent on that decision.
Given a strategy µ = (N, r) of the seller, the investment decision of agent i = 1, . . . , N can be described by a number p i ∈ [0, 1], namely the probability of investing in value discovery. Throughout, our interest is in (equilibrium) situations where this decision is symmetric across the agents, i.e. p i ≡ p for some p ∈ [0, 1]. 10 In view of the above, taking as given that each of her rivals invests in value discovery with probability p, the payoff of any buyer is zero if she does not invest in value discovery but equals U N (p, r) − c from electing to incur the cost where
and
9 LS make this assumption but in their model, it is always ex-post efficient for trade to occur. In particular, this means (1) cannot hold. Unlike them, this behavior in our model, is self-enforcing. Moreover, we shall see through Lemma 1 the seller finds it in fact optimal to ignore the information about the number of actual bidders. 10 In fact it can be shown that if (p1, . . . , pN ) were to arise in an equilibrium of any µ, then for any interior pi, pj, it is necessarily the case that pi = pj. Hence the symmetry assumption is not as strong as it may initially appear.
is expected revenue of the seller. Equilibrium is now defined as follows:
Definition 4 (Information Acquisition Equilibrium) p e (µ, c) ∈ [0, 1] is said to be a symmetric equilibrium of a selling procedure µ = (N, r) if at p = p e (µ, c) one of the following conditions hold: a). U N (p, r)−c = 0; b). U N (p, r)−c > 0 and p = 1; or c). U N (p, r)−c < 0 and p = 0. The equilibrium is said to be a full participation equilibrium if p e (µ; c) = 1 and a partial or random participation equilibrium if 0 < p e (µ; c) < 1.
Revenue maximizing selling procedure
Let us then consider the problem of finding the selling procedure that yields the most revenue across all Information Acquisition Equilibria. To proceed with the analysis of this section, it is necessary to assume that the hazard rate (1 − F (v))/f (v) is decreasing. This is a well known sufficient condition for ensuring that F is regular distribution, which is to say that the function of "virtual values" J : [v, v] −→ R where
is increasing. In particular, it also ensures R k (·) is concave and has a unique maximum at the Myerson's reserve r m (See Myerson (1981) ), defined by the equation
The following lemma is the key to the solution of the problem at hand.
is decreasing. The equilibrium expected revenue in an arbitrary selling procedure µ = (N, r 1 , . . . , r N ) is bounded above by the equilibrium revenue of a selling procedureμ = (N,r, . . . ,r) for somer ≥ v 0 .
Proof. See Appendix A.
Denote by µ N (r) the selling procedure µ = (N, r) in which the contingent reserve r is such that r k ≡ r. Lemma 1 tells us that the search for a revenue maximizing selling procedure may be confined to those selling procedures of the type µ N (r). Such selling procedures are interesting for at least three reasons. First, the strategy of the seller is considerably simplified -she simply gives exclusive bidding rights to some N of the agents and stand ready to run SPA(r). Second, an equilibrium, say p, of a µ N (r) defines a SAP ν = (N, p, r) in which the payoffs and allocation coincide with the equilibrium allocation of µ N (r). Third, by choosing a constant reserve, interestingly the seller ignores information (about the number of actual and (equivalently) informed bidders) when devising the optimal auction.
At this stage, the reader might well anticipate, given the second of the above three points, that a revenue maximizing selling procedure must be closely linked, if not identical, to the seller optimal SAP outlined in Proposition 2. The only caveat is that the seller optimal SAP only requires individual rationality whereas the definition of an equilibrium requires this to be binding, whenever the equilibrium is partial. By appealing to Remark 2 however, we are led to the main result of this paper, without a need for a further formal proof.
Theorem 1 (Revenue Maximizing Selling Procedure) Suppose (1 − F (v))/f (v) is decreasing and let c > 0 be given.
1. If N ef = M the seller does not exclude any buyer. She runs a second price auction with a possibly non-trivial reserver = min{r c , r m }. All M buyers invest in value discovery and participate in the auction with probability one.
2. If N ef < M , there exists a u * ∈ (u N ef +1 , u N ef ) such that (a) If c > u * , seller grants exclusive bidding rights N ef buyers. Seller runs a second price auction with a possibly non-trivial reserver = min{r c , r m } and all N ef buyers invest in value discovery and participate in the auction with probability one.
(b) If c < u * , the seller grants exclusive bidding rights to N ef + 1 buyers and runs a second price auction that is ex-post efficient (i.e. the reserve is set at v 0 ). Each of these N ef + 1 buyers invests in value discovery with probability p c .
When c = u * , both Part 2a and Part 2b are true.
Theorem 1 yields two important insights. First, the Theorem highlights the close connection between the socially efficient value discovery and the extent of value discovery that occurs in the revenue maximizing selling procedure. The Theorem also shows that when c > u * , i.e. the costs are relatively high, the extent of value discovery that occurs under revenue maximization is also the socially optimal investment in value discovery. On the other hand, if the cost is less significant, value discovery is random. However the object is assigned in a socially optimal manner among the informed buyers. We collect these observations as the following corollary to Theorem 1.
Corollary 1 (Equlibrium & Socially Efficient Value Discovery)
When the cost c is such that:
1. Either Part 1 or Part 2a of Theorem 1 holds, the equilibrium value discovery is socially efficient. However, the consequent allocation of the object among the informed buyers is ex-post inefficient.
2. Part 2b of Theorem 1 holds, then the equilibrium value discovery is socially inefficient. However, the consequent allocation of the object among the informed buyers is necessarily ex-post efficient.
Second, note that the Theorem shows that for any N < M , whenever c ∈ (u N +1 , u N ), there is a u * ∈ (u N +1 , u N ) such that the optimal reserve is v 0 if c ≤ u * and r c ≥ v 0 otherwise. From its definition, it is clear that r c is decreasing in c with r c = v 0 when c = u N . Therefore Corollary 2 is a characteristic of the seller's ability to directly control the number of buyers. If granting exclusive bidding rights were not possible and all M buyers could freely choose whether to invest in value discovery, since u M < c in Corollary 2, the optimal reserve is the constant v 0 with no further dependence on c. Corollary 2 can therefore form a basis for an empirical inquiry on exclusive bidding.
Value of a bidder
It is useful to offer perhaps a somewhat alternative outline of the proof of Theorem 1 in terms of the "value of an additional bidder". For any market size N > N c + 1, both at N and N − 1 the Information Acquisition Equilibrium is necessarily random. Therefore, the "market tightness principle" of LS is directly applicable and the seller gains from dropping a bidder.
When N ≤ N c , there is a r ≥ v 0 such that u N (r) = c. If r > r m , then u N (r m ) > c. In this case, clearly dropping a bidder cannot increase the seller's revenue. Assume r ≤ r m . Note that the seller is able to get all the buyers participate with probability one by setting r = (r, . . . , r). By doing this, she also drives the entire rent of a buyer to zero and gets the entire social surplus W N (r)−N c as her revenue. By dropping a bidder, if the seller induces an equilibrium in which all N − 1 buyers participate with probability one, the highest possible payoff of the seller is the resulted total expected social surplus W N −1 (r )−(N −1)c, where u N −1 (r ) ≥ c and r ≥ r. 11 Therefore, the change in revenue is higher than
(using (8)) which is positive. To complete the "additional competition is valuable" principle of BK however, one needs to also establish that lower revenue is achieved in an Information Acquisition Equilibrium where entry is in mixed strategies. For this, Lemma 1 is needed to conclude that a constant reserve can be chosen. After this, an argument in terms of efficiency as in the proof of Proposition 2 applies.
The above arguments reveal that maximal revenue for a given N is first increasing in the market size N until N c and decreasing to the right of N c + 1. This monotonicity strengthens Theorem 1 which only offers the globally optimal number of bidders to be given the exclusive bidding right.
On ex-ante fees and value discovery subsidies
We now return to the issues raised in Section 3 (see the paragraph following Definition 3) on how the results change if value discovery investment is publicly verifiable. One might now allow the seller to provide a subsidy to offset the value discovery costs that is paid contingent on incurring them. That is, along with committing to the vector of reserves r, the seller could also announce a subsidy s ≥ 0 to be paid to a potential buyer if she makes the investment. From a buyer's point of view, this has the same impact as reducing the value discovery cost from c to c − s. With a consequent relaxing of the incentives to engage in value discovery, it may be speculated that the seller can gain as she can then set a higher reserve. This is not the case.
More formally, let a selling procedure now be the tuple µ = (N, r 1 , . . . , r N , s) where s ≥ 0. In the selling procedure µ = (N, r, s) , if the buyers participate with a probability p, the payoff of the seller is Π N (p, r) − N ps while a buyer will engage in value discovery only if U N (p, r) ≥ c − s. We have the following.
Proposition 3 Let c > 0 be given. In any revenue maximizing selling procedureμ = (N ,r,ŝ), the seller sets a zero subsidy, i.e.ŝ = 0. The choice ofN andr is exactly as in Theorem 1.
The reason why such subsidies cannot help is fairly intuitive. Given N , both subsides and reserves may be used to influence participation. Setting a non-trivial reserve is distortive, it results in an ex-post inefficient allocation. To the extent that participation can be guaranteed with a lower reserve and a correspondingly lower subsidy, the seller gains from the increased efficiency.
The situation with entry fees as opposed to subsidies is different. We know from Proposition 6 LS that if the seller initially selects a market size N ≥ N c + 1, entry fees do not have any role. However, the seller can do better by selecting the market size N ef (≤ N c ). More formally, let a selling procedure now be the tuple µ = (N, r 1 , . . . , r N , f ) where f ≤ 0. All other details are just as in the case of subsidies.
Proposition 4 If the seller can charge entry fees, the revenue maximizing strategy for the seller is to grant exclusive bidding rights to N ef buyers, runs an ex-post efficient auction and charges an entry fee of f = c − u N ef . Equilibrium value discovery is socially efficient and the seller gets the entire social surplus
The proof is clear -given the seller's strategy, it is a pure strategy equilibrium for each of the N ef buyers to invest in value discovery. For, following the suggested action yields them a payoff of u N ef − c − |f | = 0 which makes them indifferent to taking any other action. The seller obviously cannot do any better since, by Proposition 1, W N ef − N ef c is the maximum total social surplus that can be generated.
The role of inequality (1)
Inequality (1) is motivated by the fact that in many situations, a buyer needs to discover whether there are gains from trade. Such investment is of course needed only if the prior is such that it is sometimes ex-post inefficient to trade. Of course, one can have expost inefficiency even if (1) does not hold. But when investment is not observable, this assumption ensures that buyers who do not discover their values do not bid in auction at stage two. Of course, one can drop the assumption and instead assume (as in LS) that value discovery investment is publicly observable together with an exogenous restriction that an uninformed buyer is not allowed to participate.
Conclusion
In an environment where creation of any gains from trade is only possible if buyers engage in costly information acquisition, we have studied the role of exclusive bidding rights in revenue maximizing auctions. We obtain several new insights concerning optimal auction design: a) The close connection between the social desirability of investment in value discovery of an additional bidder and the value of a bidder to the seller. b) The seller may actually prefer to induce random participation in the auction. c) The optimal reserve as a function of the value discovery cost is non-monotonic and discontinuous.
Exclusive bidding rights are often frowned upon by the anti-trust authorities. From this viewpoint, the last of these is especially interesting as it forms a basis for new empirical work on the use of exclusion as a revenue maximizing device. For example, when the cost c moves from a region (u N ef +1 , u * ) to (u * , u N ef ), we should observe tightening of market by the seller together with a jump in the reserve. Even if an econometrician cannot observe the number of buyers with the exclusive bidding rights, he can still determine whether exclusive bidding is practiced by investigating the relation between c and the observed reserve.
Appendix A
If each of N buyers invest with probability p and SPA k (r k ) occurs when k of them discover their valuations, then the total ex-ante welfare is
Also note that when r k ≡ r, we have (9) and (10)).
Lemma A The following holds for all N, p, c:
Proof of Lemma A. We note that
3) is proved in LS but may also be verified directly using (3).
Proof of Proposition 2 continued.
The proof of Part 3 consists of three steps. It uses Lemma A. The revenue under ν 2 is S(c) ≡ S N ef +1 (p c , v 0 , c), where p c , it may be recalled is interior of [0, 1] . The first step in the remainder of the proof consists of showing that S(·) is a decreasing convex function. Next, let R(c) denote the seller's revenue underν 1 . Since (1 − F (v))/f (v) is assumed to be decreasing, underν 1 , we haver = min{r c , r m } where r m is the unconstrained Myerson reserve defined by (11). Therefore,
,r = r c and therefore R(c) = W N ef (r c ) − N ef c. The second step in the proof involves showing that R(·) is also decreasing in this region, just as S(·), but that it is concave. The final step involves showing that R(·) intersects S(·) from below at some u * ∈ (u N ef +1 , u N ef ) -since R(c) − S(c) is concave, such a u * must be unique and that completes the proof.
Step 1. Since p c maximizes S N ef +1 (·, v 0 , c), by the envelope theorem, the derivative of
Therefore, S(·) is decreasing in c. To see that it is convex, we need to verify that dpc dc < 0. Given the definition of p c , we must have
by Lemma A. Differentiating the above identity with respect to c gives N ef dp c dc
Step 2. Assume that max{u N ef +1 , u N ef (r m )} ≤ c < u N ef . In this region, R(c) = W N ef (r c ) − N ef c, which we need to show is decreasing and concave. Taking u N ef (r c ) = c in (5) to be an identity and noting that u k (r) = −(1 − F (r))G k−1 (r) give
Using the fact that
J(r c ) < J(r m ) = v 0 since r c < r m and hence dR(c) dc < 0. Moreover, since r c > v 0 and f (·)/(1 − F (·)) is increasing, the fact that r c is decreasing implies that the first term in (A.6) is decreasing in c, i.e.
Step 3. We will first argue that R(u N ef +1 ) < S(u N ef +1 ) and R(u N ef ) > S(u N ef ). Observe that when c = u N ef +1 , S(u N ef +1 ) = W N ef +1 − (N ef + 1)c, the highest total welfare, as obtained in Proposition 1. Therefore, R(u N ef +1 ) < S(u N ef +1 ). Likewise, when c = u N ef , we have R(u N ef ) = W N ef − (N ef )c which, by Proposition 1 again, is the highest social welfare and is hence greater than the social welfare S(u N ef ). From the above reasoning, the function d(c) = R(c) − S(c) is such that d(u N ef +1 ) < 0 and d(u N ef ) > 0. Since it is continuous, there is u * ∈ (u N ef +1 , u N ef ) such that d(u * ) = 0. From Step 1 and Step 2, d(·) is concave and hence such a u * must be unique.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let µ = (N, r 1 , . . . , r N ) be given. The lemma requires a non-trivial proof only when the equilibrium p is partial. Otherwise, p = 1 would continue to be an equilibrium ofμ = (N, r N , . . . , r N ) and the revenue is the same under µ andμ.
We begin with the easier case where N ≥ N c +1. By Part 2, Lemma A,
0 ) with the inequality being strict unless r = (v 0 , . . . , v 0 ). Now consider the remaining case where N ≤ N c . Pick an interior p ∈ (0, 1) arbitrarily and consider the optimization program P where
wheres > 0 is a suitably large upper bound. If the seller could offer a subsidy contingent on a buyer investing in value discovery, her payoff would be Π N (p, r) − N ps which, by Lemma A, would be equal to S N (p, r, c) if the above constraint is met.
Let (r * , s * ) be a solution to the above program. The proof can be completed as follows if it can be established that r * k ≡ r * ≥ v 0 and that s * = 0. Given a µ = (N, r) whose equilibrium is an interior p and r = r * , on using Lemma A we have Π N (p, r) = S N (p, r, c) < S N (p, r * , c) = Π N (p, r * ). Thus,μ = (N, r * , . . . , r * ) dominates µ for the seller.
Let us then analyze P. Clearly it must have a solution, since all the involved functions are continuous and the domain is compact. We first claim that r k ≥ v 0 for all k. Indeed, suppose to the contrary and that r * k < v 0 for some k. One can then add to r * k slightly, which lowers U N (p, r), but also add to s * to offset this increase and keep the constraint intact. Since S N (p, (·, r * −k ), c) is increasing to the left of v 0 , the above change immediately contradicts that (r * , s * ) is a solution. Since N ≤ N c , we know that r N,c ≥ v 0 and also that u k (r N,c ) > 0 for all k < N . Should it be the case that r * k ≤ r N,c for all k, it would then mean U N (p, r * ) > c and the only way to satisfy the constraint in P would be to have s * < 0. Since s * ≥ 0, we must have r * k > r N,c for some k.
We can now prove that s * = 0. Otherwise, pick r * k > r N,c and reduce it slightly, which increases U N (p, r), but since s * > 0, it can also be reduced to offset this increase and keep the constraint intact. Since S N (p, (·, r * −k ), c) is decreasing to the right of v 0 , the above change immediately contradicts that (r * , s * ) is a solution.
Therefore s * = 0.
It remains to prove that r * k = r * . Set up the Lagrangian L(r, λ) = S N (p, r, c) + λ c − U N (p, r) for P by stipulating s = 0. Recalling W k (r) and u k (r) from Step 2, of proof of Proposition 2 earlier in this Appendix A, we have
Recall r * k ≥ v 0 . Since ϕ k (v) < 0, it cannot be the case that r * k = v for some k. Hence there exists an ≤ N such that r * ∈ (v 0 , v). For this r * , the first order condition for an interior optimum requires that ϕ (r * ) = 0, i.e. N p(v 0 − r * )f (r * ) + λ(1 − F (r * )) = 0 and therefore λ > 0. Using this, for any r * k ∈ [v 0 , v), we may rewrite ϕ k (r * k ) as
The term in the large brackets is positive for r * k < r * and negative for r * k > r * due to the monotone hazard rate. In particular, the partial derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to any r k is positive (negative) in a right (left) neighborhood of v (v), which means r * k = v (r * k = v). 12 Thus, r * k ∈ (v, v) and the first order necessary condition for an optimum gives ϕ k (r * k ) = 0 for all k or that r * k = r * , ∀k.
Proof of Proposition 3. Now suppose p is in fact the equilibrium investment. If 0 < p < 1 and N > N c , then again from Proposition 1, Proposition 6 and Proposition 9 of LS, the Π N (p, r) − N ps is dominated by the payoff underν 2 . On the other hand if N ≤ N c , the proof of Lemma 1 suffices. During the course of that proof, the optimization program P effectively solves the seller's problem while allowing for subsidies. If p = 1 and N ≤ N c , the proof of Part 1, Proposition 2 applies with a minor modification.
participate if and only if she invests in value discovery. In this Appendix, we explain why this assertion holds.
Let η = E[V i ]. Also Y k and Y k−1 denote the highest and the second highest order statistic from the k variables V 1 , . . . , V k . Consider a SPA(r) with k informed buyers and at least two uninformed buyers. It is a dominant strategy for each of the uninformed buyers to bid η. Hence, if r ≤ η, the seller's payoff in this auction is
(B.1)
Next, if it is a SPA(r) with k informed buyers and one uninformed buyers, the seller's payoff in this auction is
From (1) and above, it follows that whenever there is at least uninformed buyer in an SPA(r), the seller's payoff is no more than R k (η). Now, suppose the seller, having selected a market size N , were to choose a r = (r 1 , . . . , r N ) such that an uninformed buyer prefers to participate. Continuing to assume a symmetric equilibrium in which buyers invest in value discovery with probability p, but all the buyers participate regardless of whether they actually discover their value, SPA(r N ) is played but with a caveat: with probability β k (N, p), there will be k informed buyers and N − k uninformed buyers. If r N ≥ η, an uninformed never receives the object and the seller's payoff is Π N (p, r N ), If r N < η, from above the seller's payoff is bounded about by Π N (p, η). The appropriate SAPν 1 orν 2 dominates this payoff.
